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A YOUNG MAN COMPLETES endless days in class, hundreds of
tests, limitless paperwork, and exhausting studies to graduate from
college with his name affixed to a diploma representing his school's
certification of accomplishment. With diploma in hand, a job comes
his way with only one catch: the employer agrees to hire him if the
young man can affirm that he has graduated from college. The em-
ployer, however, requires more than the diploma to establish that the
graduation was obtained properly. This process will require the stu-
dent to produce every test, attendance record, and classroom assign-
ment for the employer to review. Without knowledge of these
requirements, the recent graduate no longer has his tests and attend-
ance records, much less proof that he was properly admitted based on
his high school performance. Even if he had kept all of his records,
there is no guarantee that this particular employer would grade his
tests the same as his college professors: would that C- in Physics slip to
a D under the grading style of the employer?
Without the necessary documents and with the employer's new
grading style, the recent graduate does not get the job. This em-
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ployer's absurd requirement is similar to the burden California courts
place on a defendant facing a state law tort claim who attempts to
show that a new medical device has received approval by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") and that federal preemption therefore
applies.
Currently, California courts will only allow a preemption defense
to a motion for summary judgment if, in addition to the standard bur-
den of showing that the FDA approved the product, the defendant
also proves that its medical device has been properly approved by the
FDA, and that the defendant has complied with all of the FDA's Medi-
cal Device Amendment' ("MDA") regulations both during and after
the approval process.2 California courts have adopted these additional
requirements as a result of Steele v. Collagen Corp.,3 which places an
undue burden on defendants who are properly moving for summary
judgment based on federal preemption of state tort laws. Unable to
show federal preemption without overcoming the burden requiring
both the production of records and information they may not have
and undergoing scrutiny on the propriety of the FDA's decision, FDA
approval may not protect many companies in the way Congress in-
tended when it included preemptive language in the MDA.
This Comment argues that the Steele standard is inconsistent with
the liberal summary judgment standards recently adopted by Califor-
nia in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.4 It further argues that the Steele
standard cuts against the intent and purpose of federal preemption,
improperly requires the judicial branch to perform legislative func-
tions, and was read into a previous Supreme Court case that does not
support its existence. These issues make it clear that the requirement
should be replaced with a more relaxed burden-shifting standard that
furthers the purposes of both summary judgment and federal pre-
emption. Just as the employer should hire our graduate upon his pres-
entation of a diploma, so too should the court grant summary
judgment in favor of the moving defendant based on preemption
where the defendant offers evidence that the FDA has approved the
product, without regard to whether the FDA has properly approved and
maintained approval of the product. Then, unless the plaintiff can
proffer some evidence that would lead the court to think that the ap-
1. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301
(2000)); H.R. REP. No. 94-1090 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
2. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 888-89 (Ct. App. 1997).
3. Id.
4. 24 P.3d 493, 512 (Cal. 2001).
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proval was improper or non-existent, the court should grant the mo-
tion for summary judgment.
This Comment focuses on Steele's elevated burden on the moving
defendant raising an MDA preemption defense related to medical de-
vices. Part I examines the requirements for initial and continuing FDA
approval of new medical devices, in particular Class III medical de-
vices. It will continue to reveal the incredible hurdle that companies
must leap in order to obtain and maintain FDA approval for such de-
vices. This Part also illustrates the creation of the burdensome re-
quirement applied by California courts. Part II details the errors and
the lack of foundation of the Steele requirement and proposes a stan-
dard that simply requires a showing of FDA approval to shift the bur-
den to the plaintiff to point out impropriety in the approval or
compliance with the FDA requirements.
I. California's Creation of a Burdensome Requirement to
Prove Preemption Based on the Medical Device
Amendments
A. The Medical Device Amendments Subject Class II1 Medical
Devices to a Rigorous Approval Process
Through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 5 ("FDCA"), as
amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,6 Congress
charges the FDA with ensuring that medical devices are safe and effec-
tive before they are placed on the market. Congress added the MDA
to the FDCA as regulatory guidelines that divide devices into three
classes depending on the degree of regulation necessary to ensure
their safety and effectiveness. 7 This Comment focuses on Class III
devices.
Class III devices undergo the most stringent control of any of the
devices under the MDA. 8 This classification is reserved for those de-
5. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301
(2000)); H.R. REP. No. 94-1090 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
8. Id. § 360c(a) (1) (A). A small number of Class III devices can circumvent the PMA
process. Id. §360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. §814.1(c)(1) (2005); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(b) (1) (B); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996). This Comment does
not address the law that should apply to products meeting the alternate approval methods.
The first group of devices that can avoid the PMA process are pre-1976 devices that are
"grandfathered" in until the FDA initiates and completes the PMA. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1). The second group are those devices that are
Winter 2006] MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
vices used to support or sustain life and for devices that pose a poten-
tial unreasonable risk of illness or injury.9 To determine a device's
classification, the FDA maintains a list of devices and their classifica-
tions.10 The list includes such Class III devices as artificial hearts,"
implanted cerebellar stimulators, a2 and implantable pacemaker
parts.13 If the device has not previously been classified, the FDA will
classify the device as a Class III medical device if it finds that the de-
vice presents a potentially unreasonable risk of illness or injury, if the
device is used in supporting or sustaining human life, or if it is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human life.' 4
Before the FDA may approve such Class III devices, they must go
through a rigorous pre-market approval process providing "reasona-
ble assurance of safety and effectiveness of a device .... -15 The
United States Supreme Court stated that "[d]espite its relatively in-
nocuous phrasing, the process of establishing this 'reasonable assur-
ance,' which is known as the 'premarket approval,' or 'PMA' process,
is a rigorous one. '"16
The pre-market approval ("PMA") process requires manufactur-
ers to spend an average of 1200 hours on each submission, detailing
information regarding the safety and efficacy of their devices. 17 Manu-
facturers file an application that provides all information they know or
reasonably should know about the design, manufacturing, use, and
labeling of the device.' 8 The application is then reviewed through a
four-step process. 19 The "[a] pproval of a medical device through the
PMA process can take months or even several years" in a process that
"substantially equivalent" to pre-existing devices that have avoided the PMA process due to
the first exception. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1) (B).
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a) (1) (C) (ii).
10. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Product Classi-
fication Database Search, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/clas-
sification.cfm [hereinafter Device Database Search] (last accessed Jan. 20, 2006).
11. Device Database Search, supra note 10 (search for "Product Code" = "LOX").
12. Device Database Search, supra note 10 (search for "Product Code" = "LOZ").
13. Device Database Search, supra note 10 (search for "Product Code" = "DXY").
14. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a) (1) (C) (ii). Devices that fall within the latter two elements
must also not be able to be classified as Class I or II devices to be classified as a Class III
device. Id.
15. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(B) (iii).
16. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
17. Id.
18. Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Meeting the Objectives of the MDA: Implied Preemption of
State Tort Claims by the Medical Device Amendments, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 343, 346 (1995).
19. U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, Review Pro-
cess, Overview, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/review-process.html#steps
[hereinafter FDA Review Process Overview] (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
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includes an outside panel of experts to make recommendations re-
garding the device. 20
The first step involves an administrative and limited scientific re-
view by FDA staff to determine if an application is complete.21 Upon
successful completion of the first step, the FDA files the application,
making a threshold determination that it is "sufficiently complete to
permit a substantive review."22 This begins the 180-day period for re-
view of the application.2 3
The second step includes an in-depth scientific, regulatory, and
quality systems review by FDA personnel. 24 During this review, the
FDA will notify the applicant of any deficiency in the application, and
the applicant may submit an amendment.25 If any amendment con-
tains significant updates, the review period may be extended to allow
for thorough evaluation of the updates. 26
The third step includes a review and recommendations by an
outside panel.27 This step is not required, but in general, "all PMAs
for the first-of-a-kind device are taken before the appropriate advisory
panel."28 PMAs that are referred to a panel must hold a public meet-
ing to review the PMA and then submit a final report to the FDA that
includes recommendations and the basis for such recommenda-
tions.29
Finally, the FDA begins final deliberations, documentation, and
notification of the FDA decision.30 This occurs within 180 days of the
filing in step one, and, if approved, the public will be notified and the
applicant will then have to submit final labeling of the product before
market.31
In addition to the rigorous PMA process, any subsequent changes
to the product trigger the requirement that the manufacturer submit
a PMA supplemental application.3 2 Furthermore, to maintain the con-
tinued validity of the FDA's approval, the manufacturer must submit
20. Radwan, supra note 18, at 347.
21. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42 (2005); FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
22. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42(a).
23. Id. § 814.42(b).
24. Id. § 814.44; FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
25. FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
26. Id.
27. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44; FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
28. FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
29. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(b); FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
30. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(c); FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
31. FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
32. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39.
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post-approval reports at yearly intervals to identify any changes in the
device and the medical community's understanding of the device and
its effects.3 3 This extensive process, along with specific language in the
MDA, leads to federal preemption of state law.
B. Federal Preemption and the Medical Device Amendments
1. Federal Preemption of State Law Provides Uniformity As
Congress Intends
In our system of dual federal and state governments, Article VI of
the Constitution creates order by providing that when Congress so
intends, the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . .any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding. '3 4 The doctrine of federal preemption im-
plements this constitutional directive and creates a uniformity of law
on matters regulated by federal law.35 To this end, "it has been settled
that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect."' 36 In
determining whether a state law has been preempted, "the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone,"3 7 and "[c] onsideration... starts
with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace
state law."38
The intent of Congress may be "explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure or purpose."39 This
allows state law to be preempted in three ways: (1) through express
language in the federal statute, (2) when the state law conflicts with
the federal statute, or (3) when federal law occupies the field of law to
such an extent that it is reasonable to infer that Congress intended to
preempt any state law in that field.40 If preemption is found through
any of these methods, it is no longer necessary to search for preemp-
tion authority, and the focus shifts to the scope of the preemption. 4 1
33. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2000); see also Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902,
906 (Ct. App. 1995).
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
35. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
36. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
37. Id. (quoting Malone v. White Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
38. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
39. See Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
40. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; see also Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders
Int'l Union, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984).
41. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996).
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2. Congress Intends for the Medical Device Amendments to
Preempt State Law Product Liability Claims for Class III
Medical Devices
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress's intent regarding
MDA's preemption of state law is clear.4 2 Most courts have found that
the preemptive federal law binds products that go through the PMA
process. 43 Furthermore, the MDA expressly states that federal law
preempts any state law that seeks to impose different or additional
requirements with respect to a medical device's safety or effective-
ness.44 When preemption is expressly stated in the statute, there is no
need to look beyond the words of the statute. 45 Even with a minority
of courts requiring the additional determination of exactly what com-
mon law claims Congress intended to preempt,46 it is clear that the
rigorous and detailed PMA process requirements preempt all state
common law claims that impose different or additional standards. 47
Therefore, the only analysis of the state law claim is whether it im-
poses different or additional standards.
"Until 1996, nearly every court which had considered [the MDA's
preemptive language] . . .had held that state tort law is a state 're-
quirement' under this provision because state tort law has the ability
to require a manufacturer to endure additional testing or modifica-
tion to prevent liability."4 8 In 1996, the Supreme Court muddied the
MDA's preemptive language by holding that "state law is only a 're-
quirement' if it is 'specific.' 49 Nevertheless, California courts have
uniformly stated that common law claims may apply such specific re-
quirements as to be preempted by the MDA.50
Steele also supports the premise that the MDA preempted state
common law claims, explicitly stating, "a state common law tort claim
relating to the safety and effectiveness of a device is preempted" by the
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484.
43. See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993); King v.
Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (lst Cir. 1993); Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (Ct. App. 1995).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484.
45. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 483.
46. See id.
47. Although the MDA may not preempt all consumer claims, claims regarding de-
vices subject to the MDA regulations, such as Class III medical devices, are preempted by
federal law. See King, 983 F.2d at 1139.
48. Radwan, supra note 18, at 350.
49. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 500; Radwan, supra note 18, at 350-51.
50. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 888 (Ct. App. 1997).
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MDA.51 Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he design, manufac-
ture, and labeling of the device, as approved by the FDA as safe and
effective after the device has undergone the PMA process, are the spe-
cific federal requirements giving rise to preemption."5 2 Therefore, a
state common law claim is preempted, as courts have properly held, if
a manufacturer of a Class III medical device shows that the subject
device underwent the FDA's rigorous PMA process, and the plaintiffs
suit seeks to impose different or additional requirements. 53
Recently, in addition to a number of cases where courts have held
that devices submitted to the PMA process are controlled by the pre-
empted federal law,54 the FDA stated in an amicus brief that the MDA
preempts state product liability claims, which impose requirements
that are different from or in addition to FDA requirements. 55 Moreo-
ver, the brief demonstrates that the FDA's current position is that the
preemption provision of the MDA specifically encompasses require-
ments imposed by state tort judgments. 56 The next issue is the re-
quirements that a defendant must meet in order to receive summary
judgment based on a preemption defense.
C. California's Summary Judgment Standard and the Burden
Courts Place on a Defendant Moving for a Summary
Judgment on the Defense of Federal Preemption
Based on the Medical Device Amendments
1. Modem Summary Judgment Standard in California
The California Supreme Court's landmark authority on summary
judgment, Aguilar, was decided after Steele and sets out the modern
51. Id. The court differentiates the preemptive power of the MDA when dealing with
devices that underwent the less stringent substantial equivalence test, requiring only that
the manufacturer show the device is substantially similar to a device already approved, as
opposed to the full PMA process. See generally id. The court distinguished this scenario with
that found not to be preemptive in Medtronic. Id. at 888.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993); King v.
Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st Cir. 1993); Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (Ct. App. 1995).
54. See Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2001); Brooks v.
Howmedica Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 799 (8th Cir. 2001); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216,
227-28 (6th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 1997);
McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-005-LJM-WGH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22819, at
*29 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2004); Davenport v. Medtronic, Inc. 302 F. Supp. 2d 419, 430 (E.D.
Pa. 2004).
55. See generally Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent/
Petitioner at 30-31, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4597).
56. See id. at 18.
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burden and procedure for summary judgment as interpreted from
California Code.57 The Aguilar court favorably described summary
judgment as "a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in
order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute. ' 58 This mechanism is intended to
"'avoid a ... trial' rendered 'useless' by nonsuit or directed verdict or
similar device."59 To that end, the Aguilar court made plain that sum-
mary judgment motions should be liberally granted.60 The court held
that a defendant moving for summary judgment does not bear the
burden of negating an element of a plaintiffs cause of action, but
rather must show either that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential
element or that there is a complete defense against the claim.61 Be-
cause preemption is a complete defense, the burden of showing pre-
emption is on the defendant.62
Therefore, to successfully move for summary judgment, a manu-
facturer of a Class III medical device must make a prima facie showing
that the subject device underwent the FDA's rigorous PMA process
and that the plaintiffs state tort lawsuit seeks to impose different or
additional standards. 63 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show
that his claim would not impose additional or different requirements,
or that the manufacturer failed to comply with federal requirements
imposed by the FDA.64 This is the scheme applied to MDA preemp-
tion defenses. 65
2. The Court's Exaggeration of the Defendant's Burden in a
Summary Judgment Motion
Although the burden that would be expected from the Aguilar
standard appears innocuous, the California court in Steele raised the
57. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West 2005); Aguilar v. Ad. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d
493, 505 (Cal. 2001).
58. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 505.
59. Id. at 514 (quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1109 (2000) (Chin, J.,
concurring)).
60. See id. (modern California summary judgment law now largely conforms to its "lib-
eralized" "federal counterpart").
61. Id. at 512.
62. Marshall v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 76 (Ct. App. 1992); see also
Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 513.
63. See supra Part I.B.2.
64. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 513 (holding that once the defendant makes the necessary
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present admissible evidence establishing that
there is a triable issue of material fact).
65. See generally Brooks v. Medtronic Corp., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001).
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burden for the defendant to make a prima facie showing that the de-
vice underwent the FDA's PMA process.
In Steele, plaintiff Patricia Steele filed a civil suit for damages
against defendant Collagen Corporation, when Steele developed an
autoimmune disorder after receiving a test injection of Collagen Cor-
poration's Zyderm. 66 Zyderm is classified as a Class III device, 67 which
did not go through the FDA's substantial equivalence approval pro-
cess ("SEAP")-an approval process that does not always lead to pre-
emption-but went through the full PMA certification process that
preempts state law.68
At the trial level, Collagen Corporation moved for summary judg-
ment, asserting that Steele's causes of action were preempted by the
MDA because the FDA had approved Zyderm. 69 It asserted in its state-
ment of undisputed facts that it had submitted Zyderm to the FDA for
the PMA process and that Zyderm had ultimately been approved by
the FDA as being "safe and effective for use."70 The trial court agreed
with Collagen Corporation and found that Steele's causes of action
were preempted. 7' It granted the motion and entered judgment in
favor of Collagen Corporation. 72 Steele appealed to the Third District
Court of Appeal in California, leading to the decision that is the sub-
ject of this Comment.73
In the appeal to the California Court of Appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment
based on federal preemption. 74 The plaintiff argued this contention
on the grounds that no state common law action is ever preempted
under the MDA.75 The court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr76 to
determine whether state common law claims are preempted under
the MDA after the product has gone through the PMA process. 77
Medtronic, decided in 1996, was a case involving a Class III medi-
cal device that underwent the SEAP, the less rigorous test under the
66. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 880-81 (Ct. App. 1997).
67. Id. at 882.
68. Id. at 889.
69. Id. at 881.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 885.
75. See id.
76. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
77. See Steele, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882-86.
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MDA. 78 In Medtronic, the Court determined that there was no preemp-
tion under the MDA when the product underwent the SEAP. 79 The
court in Steele, however, found that based on Medtronic, a state claim is
preempted when: "(1) . . . [the] state damages award on the claim
would establish a state requirement applicable to the device which is
different from or in addition to a federal requirement and (2) ... the
FDA has established a specific counterpart requirement for the de-
vice."80 In this case, "specific counterpart requirement[s]" include the
PMA process requirements that Class III medical devices undergo
when they do not undergo the SEAP.8 1 Additionally, the court noted
that where the manufacturer violates the FDA requirements, preemp-
tion does not apply.82
The court in Steele then addressed whether the state common law
establishes a requirement applicable to the device that is different
than or in addition to the federal requirements. 8 3 Finding that "com-
mon law standards of care and behavior impose specific require-
ments"8 4 and that those requirements are different than the FDA
standards,8 5 the court was left with the final task of determining
whether Zyderm was "designed, manufactured, and labeled according
to the specifications approved by the FDA."8 6 Or otherwise stated,
whether Collagen Corporation had met its prima facie showing that
the FDA approved its device.
In determining whether Collagen Corporation followed the FDA
requirements, the court required that Collagen Corporation prove
compliance. To do this, the court required Collagen Corporation to
show not only evidence that the product had gone through the rigor-
ous PMA process and ultimately been approved, but additionally that
the product complied with all the requirements of the FDA and PMA
process.8 7 Because the Court of Appeal could not determine from the
record whether Collagen Corporation met the federal standard of
care emanating from the PMA process, considering that determina-
78. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
79. Id. at 501.
80. Steele, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 886-87.
84. Id. at 887.
85. Id. at 887-88.
86. Id. at 889.
87. See id.
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tion is best made by the FDA during the process, the court reversed
summary judgment.88
Much like the recent graduate was unable to meet the burden of
proof required by the demanding potential employer, Collagen Cor-
poration was unable to meet the unexpected requirement of proving
that the FDA acted properly in approving the product and that there
was full compliance. This requirement, set by Steele, serves as a difficult
hurdle for defendants arguing federal preemption based on a Class III
medical device undergoing the PMA process.8 9
For example, in Robinson v. Sultzer Orthopedics,90 the defendant
Sultzer Orthopedics brought a motion for summary judgment based
on federal preemption stemming from its product undergoing the
full PMA process.91 Sultzer asserted that it had complied with the FDA
requirements and that the plaintiff's cause of action created different
and additional requirements: the two elements necessary for preemp-
tion to apply.92
The plaintiff responded by stating that Sultzer's "attempt to estab-
lish ... [that the device was manufactured in compliance with FDA
requirements] is inadequate."93 The plaintiff then analogized the case
with Steele asserting that Sultzer had not met its burden of proving
compliance and therefore preemption did not apply.94
Following the Steele court's precedent, the Robinson court denied
the motion for summary judgment. 95 In its denial, the court discussed
Sultzer's inability to meet the burden necessary to show that it had
complied with the FDA requirements. 96 The Robinson decision further
illustrates the continuing onerous burden emanating from Steele by
stating that the plaintiff has no burden of showing non-compliance
with FDA requirements to avoid the preemption defense when the
88. See id.
89. See Robinson v. Sultzer Orthopedics, Ltd., No. 2001-029190 (Cal. Super. Ct. Ala-
meda County Aug. 20, 2004) (order denying motion for summary judgment).
90. Id.
91. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Adjudication, Robinson v. Sultzer Orthopedics, Ltd., No. 2001-029190 (Cal. Sup,
Ct. Alameda County June 4, 2004).
92. See id.
93. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication at 8, Robinson v.
Sultzer Orthopedics, Ltd., No. 2001-029190 (Cal. Sup. Ct. of Alameda County Aug. 4,
2004).
94. See id. at 9.
95. See Robinson v. Sultzer Orthopedics, Ltd., No. 2001-029190, at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Alameda County Aug. 20, 2004) (order denying motion for summary judgment).
96. See id. at 3-4.
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defendant's evidence is inadequate to show compliance.9 7 This bur-
den is too great on the moving defendant and should be reduced.
H. The Burden Should Be Reduced to Stay in Line with the
Purpose of Summary Judgment and the Intention of
Federal Preemption
The court in Steele properly stated that the MDA preempts state
law when the state law has requirements that are different from or in
addition to the requirements of the MDA.98 These are the proper con-
siderations for determining preemption under the MDA and would
have led to the court finding that federal law did, in fact, preempt
Steele's claims. 99
The court, however, never addressed the issues as it should have.
Instead, it placed an impenetrable wall in the path of the moving de-
fendant, requiring it to show that it complied with all FDA regulations
and that the FDA properly approved the product before considering
the possibility of federal preemption. 100 In light of the later refine-
ment of the summary judgment standard in Aguilar, it is evident that
the hurdle is an unreasonable burden on the moving defendant. 10 1
Furthermore, this additional hurdle cuts sharply against the intent
and purpose of federal preemption and requires the courts to im-
properly perform legislative duties. 102 The proper initial burden
should be to require the defendant to show evidence that the FDA
approved the device through the PMA process, which shifts the bur-
den to the plaintiff to bring evidence that the device was improperly
approved or that the FDA's requirements were not followed.
97. See id. at 4.
98. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 886 (Ct. App. 1997).
99. See Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1423 (5th Cir. 1993); King v. Colla-
gen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (1st Cir. 1993); Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp.,
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 771 (Ct. App. 1996).
100. See Steele, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
101. See Aguilar v. Ad. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 510 (Cal. 2001).
102. Id. at 505 (quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 393 (Ct. App.
2000) (Chin, J., concurring)); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992).
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A. Modern Summary Judgment Standards Do Not Comport with
the Steele Court's Burden
1. The California Summary Judgment Standard Has Become Less
Restrictive Than the Standard Applied in Steele
The court in Aguilar declared that "[t]he purpose of the law of
summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.' ' 0 3
Although this purpose of summary judgment has not changed over
the years, the law regarding summary judgment in California has
changed dramatically. t0 4 Amendments in 1992 and 1993 to Califor-
nia's Code of Civil Procedure set the drastic change in motion. 0 5 The
amendments, however, were not completely interpreted by the courts
until the California Supreme Court handed down the Aguilar decision
in 2001.106 Steele was decided in 1997, during this period of change. 10 7
Before the amendments, summary judgment was more restrictive
in granting motions than the current law. 108 The comparatively in-
creased restrictiveness came from a number of various burdens on the
moving parties that were decreased by the Aguilar court's interpreta-
tion of the amendments. 10 9 For example, a defendant moving for
summary judgment had to present evidence to conclusively negate an
element of the plaintiffs action." 1 The modern post-Aguilar standard
only requires the defendant to point out that the plaintiff does not
possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence."'I Although
some of these changes were implied in the amendment, none became
solidified in California law until 2001 when the court in Aguilar inter-
preted the amendments to intend to bring state law more in line with
federal summary judgment standards.112
103. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 505; see also FFD. R. Civ. P. 56; 28 U.S.C. app. at R.56, Notes of
Advisory Committee on Rules, 1963 amend. to rule 56(e) (2000).
104. See Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 508-09.
105. Id.
106. See generally id. at 504 (granting review to allow the court to clarify the law that
must apply to rulings on summary judgment).
107. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879 (Ct. App. 1997).
108. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 508.
109. See id. at 507-09.
110. Id. at 508.
111. Id. at 507.
112. Id. at 508.
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2. Under the Modem and More Lenient Aguilar Standard the
Burden Emanating from Steele Is Too Great
Reviewing the decision in Steele with the understanding of sum-
mary judgment law provided by Aguilar amplifies the flaw in the
court's burden. The great burden placed on the moving defendant,
by requiring the proof of compliance with the MDA, would no doubt
be considered a restrictive-if not a prohibitive-requirement that is
far more than the prima facie showing that Aguilar requires. 1 3 This is
not in line with the Aguilar court's opinion that summary judgment
motions should be liberally granted.' 1 4
It is necessary to limit or abolish the additional MDA compliance
requirement to bring the holding of Steele more in line with the mod-
ern liberalized summary judgment standards. Many federal courts
have applied a limited and more reasonable version of this standard
and require that the defendant only prove that the device underwent,
and was approved through, the PMA process.11 5 This reinterpretation
through the lens of Aguilar would not only bring the summary judg-
ment procedure more in line with the liberal modern standard, but
would also maintain the important purpose that prompted Congress
to explicitly provide for MDA preemption.
Davenport v. Medtronic, Inc.1 16 presents an example of the modern
standards generally applied to a motion for summary judgment based
on federal preemption by the MDA. 117 In Davenport, the plaintiff al-
leged that there was no preemption because of the defendant's non-
compliance with the FDA's PMA standards.'1 8 The court decided the
summary judgment issue based on the federal summary judgment
standards in line with California's post-Aguilar summary judgment
standard.1 19 The court stated that "[i]t is clear that 'when the non-
moving party bears the burden at trial and the movant meets its bur-
den of directing the court to items demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must produce
113. See supra Part I.C.1.
114. Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 512 (stating that California summary judgment has been "liber-
alized" and now largely conforms to its "federal counterpart").
115. See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993); King v.
Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st Cir. 1993); Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (Ct. App. 1995).
116. 302 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
117. See generally id.
118. Id. at 433.
119. See id. at 435; Aguilar, 24 P.3d at 512.
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evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue."' 120 The court continued
by stating that the "non-moving party cannot sustain this burden
through unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations or mere suspi-
cions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. '12 1 Med-
tronic provided evidence that it had complied with the FDA's MDA
requirements, and the court found that, absent evidence by the non-
moving party to the contrary, the summary judgment motion would
be granted.122
Although Davenport produced some evidence on the issue, he
was unable to provide the quantity of reliable evidence necessary to
establish a genuine issue of material fact, and the summary judgment
motion was granted.123 This is just one of a number of examples
where the court granted a summary judgment motion for preemption
based on the non-moving party's inability to point out specific in-
stances of non-compliance by the defendant. 124
Courts following the federal summary judgment standard do not
require such a great burden to prevail on summary judgment. Now
that, after Aguilar, California's summary judgment procedures are in
line with federal procedures, the burden for showing that state tort
law is preempted by the MDA must be reinterpreted. The onerous
burden that California courts place on the moving defendant does
not fit with the modem, more liberal, standard illustrated above. The
burden on the movant should be amended to require only the proof
of approval and compliance with the FDA's MDA requirements. This
standard properly leaves the plaintiff to point out specific instances of
non-compliance or error to avoid summary judgment, holding true to
the procedures and burdens the Aguilar court intended to create.
B. The Steele Court's Requirement Cuts Against the Intent and
Purpose of Preemption
Federal preemption provides order and protection for an even-
handed standard.' 25 "Instead of having 50 or more standards with re-
spect to a given human pursuit, there is one."' 26 Moreover, "'[t]he
120. Davenport, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (quoting Kozma v. Medtronic, Inc., 925 F. Supp.
602, 609 (N.D. Ind. 1996)).
121. Id. (citing Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 435-38.
124. See, e.g., Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. 273 F.3d 785, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming
trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant's device manufacturer).
125. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 1997).
126. Id.
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purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption
case."127
The intent of Congress appears clear from the language of the
MDA. The MDA provides:
[N]o state or political subdivision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement ap-
plicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the de-
vice under this chapter. 128
These statements demonstrate that Congress intended the MDA to
preempt state law. Nevertheless, to understand the purpose for the
preemption one must look further.
The MDA promotes public health by encouraging the develop-
ment of new and much needed medical devices. Congress explained:
As medicine progresses, as research makes new breakthroughs, an
increasing number of sophisticated, critically important medical
devices are being developed and used in the United States. These
devices hold the promise of improving the health and longevity of
the American people. The Committee wants to encourage their re-
search and development.' 2 9
Congress intended preemption of state law claims to ensure that
"innovations in medical device technology are not stifled by unneces-
sary restrictions. " 130 Congress explained that "if a substantial number
of differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed
by jurisdictions other than the federal government, interstate com-
merce will be unduly burdened."1 3 1 Additionally, an amicus brief filed
by the FDA demonstrates that the FDA currently contends that the
preemption provision of the MDA encompasses requirements im-
posed by state tort judgments. 132 From both Congress's explanation
and the subsequent interpretations by the congressionally empowered
FDA, the MDA is intended to preempt state and local law in order to
provide one unified standard, making it less burdensome on manufac-
turers to produce new devices.
127. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Scher-
merhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
129. S. REp. No. 94-33, at 2 (1975).
130. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 12 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
131. Id.
132. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent/Petitioner,
supra note 55, at 18.
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Congress's decision to have the MDA preempt state law was based
on the recognized impediments that state law claims would have on
the development of new medical devices. 133 It recognized that requir-
ing manufacturers, such as Collagen Corporation, to comply with "50
or more standards" would greatly burden the companies' ability to
develop a product that can be sold in multiple markets and to main-
tain compliance with multiple changing standards.'3 4 Ultimately, not
only would this requirement retard the development of new beneficial
devices, but it would also increase the design, production, and market-
ing costs of products, thus increasing the cost to the end consumer.
The court in Steele recognized these matters in its analysis when it con-
cluded that the MDA does preempt state law imposing different or
additional requirements; however, it ignored the need when it created
a requirement so great that few defendants could receive the benefits
Congress intended it to provide.1
3 5
By requiring the moving defendant to show not only that the
product was approved through the PMA process, but also that it
abided by federal requirements emanating from the PMA process, the
Steele court raised the necessary burden to a degree bordering on re-
moving the availability of preemption. 136 By simply elevating a burden
required in summary judgment and thus removing preemption, the
court defeated Congress's intent to protect medical device manufac-
turers from varying and burdensome state standards.
The requirement that is more reasonable and more closely al-
igned with the intent of Congress is to allow the defendant to create
the presumption of compliance by showing that the product received
approval by the FDA through the PMA process. This requirement
would allow the device manufacturer the opportunity to access pre-
emption by gaining approval through the PMA process and abiding by
the emanating requirements. Thus, the manufacturer could avoid the
undue burden of proving approval and conformity with the require-
ments in order to avoid a failed preemption defense and necessitate
compliance with fifty or more individual state standards.
133. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 12.
134. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 1997).
135. Id. at 880, 888-89.
136. Id. at 889.
[Vol. 40
MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION DEFENSE
C. The Summary Judgment Burden Improperly Requires the
Courts to Perform Legislative Duties
A jury resolving a state tort claim regarding a medical device ap-
proved by the FDA under its comprehensive PMA process would be
forced to second-guess and reexamine the FDA's approval process
and, having done so, leave the defendant open to state tort liability for
having sold an FDA approved product in the manner the FDA
intended.
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,137 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a conflict between the FDA's
comprehensive regulatory scheme and state tort claims could give rise
to implied preemption. 138 The Buckman plaintiff charged that the de-
fendant had defrauded the FDA in its PMA submissions and that the
FDA would have required a different warning or imposed different
safety requirements had it known the truth. 139 Because these allega-
tions necessarily would require ajury to second-guess the FDA's regu-
latory actions and adopt safety requirements the FDA never imposed,
the Supreme Court concluded that the tort claim posed an unaccept-
able threat to the medical device regulation and undermined congres-
sional intent in establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 140 As
a result, the plaintiffs fraud-on-the-FDA claim was impliedly
preempted. 4 1
The idea that the courts should not oversee the jobs delegated to
administrators by Congress is evident in a number of cases. For exam-
ple, in Papas v. Upjohn Co., 1 4 2 the court stated, "it is for ... Administra-
tors], not a jury, to determine whether" there has been compliance
with the demonstration's requirements.1 43 The plaintiff in Papas al-
leged that because there was a violation of the federal requirements
on the product, federal preemption would not apply, just as the plain-
tiff in Steele successfully argued.144 Disagreeing with Steele, the Papas
court denied that compliance was a requirement and declared that
states "may not interfere with the methods designed by Congress to
137. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
138. See id. at 347.
139. See id. at 343.
140. See id. at 350-53.
141. See id. at 348.
142. 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 519.
144. Id. at 518-19.
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achieve" federal goals. 145 This rule is more closely aligned with the
intent of Congress in creating MDA preemption.1 46
As the Buckman Court noted, if a claim that effectively reviewed
the decisions made by the FDA were allowed to proceed and liability
ensued, "[a]s a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed
regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes [would]
dramatically increase the burdens facing" manufacturers, who might
then decline to seek regulatory approval of new devices out of fear of
"unpredictable civil liability. '147 This result would defeat the federal
goal of ensuring the availability of efficacious medical devices. 148 This
unfavorable situation can be avoided by limiting the court's oversight
of whether the FDA has properly approved the device and focusing it
only on whether the FDA has approved the device.
D. Inclusion of the Requirement Is Inappropriate and Is
Unjustified in Steele
The inclusion of a requirement that the manufacturer has com-
plied with the MDA for preemption to be available is suspect. It is a
unique requirement that originated in Steele where the court appears
to have read the requirement into a previous case without any analysis
of the difficult issues it presents. 149
1. The Proof Requirement Was Unjustified and Inacurately Read
into a Previous Case
In stating the requirement that a manufacturer must comply with
the FDA's requirements, the Steele court cites to the United States Su-
preme Court case Medtronic. °50 The Court in Medtronic, however, does
not address the requirement of proof of compliance with the MDA for
preemption to apply.15 1 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did
address the issue when deciding Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,' 52 the same
case at the appellate level.
That court stated, "[P] reemption under the MDA cannot be de-
feated by a common-law suit alleging a violation of the statutory
145. Id. at 519.
146. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-853, at 1, 12 (1976).
147. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
148. See id. at 350-51.
149. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 886 (Ct. App. 1997).
150. 518 U.S. 470 (1996); see also Steele, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
151. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470.
152. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1995).
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[MDA] standards." 153 Although the Supreme Court disagreed with
the finding of preemption in the Medtronic case, the Court did not
address the issue of whether a violation of the MDA removes the pre-
emption ability when a product does undergo the full PMA process
because the product had been approved only through SEAP.
154
The Steele court's conclusion that non-compliance could defeat
preemption was, therefore, relying on a Supreme Court case that did
not address, and may have implicitly denied, the issue. In an attempt
to buttress this flawed foundation, the Steele court cites to Marshall v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co.155
In Marshall, an insurance company and health plan administrator
claimed that an insured employee's actions were preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974156 ("ERISA"). ER-
ISA preemption, however, differs drastically from preemption under
the MDA. Unlike the MDA's PMA process that serves as guidelines for
the FDA's approval or denial of medical devices, ERISA is simply a
body of law designed to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee pension and benefit plans. 15 7 Although
compliance with ERISA or the PMA process may be required for pre-
emption, compliance with ERISA is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by a jury, whereas compliance with the PMA process is
determined by the FDA.158 Therefore, in Marshall, compliance with
ERISA was properly determined by the court, but the FDA, not the
court, properly determines compliance with the MDA. The Steele court
did not recognize this important difference when it burdened the
moving defendant with the proof of compliance, ignoring the govern-
ment agency set up for the purpose of determining compliance, ex-
tending Marshall well beyond its original scope. 159
It is evident that the Steele court cited Medtronic for the proposi-
tion that compliance with the FDA approval requirements is neces-
sary, although the Court never addresses the issue at the Supreme
Court level and denied the requirement in the circuit court. It is also
evident that the Steele court cited Marshall to determine the degree of
proof required to meet the burden of proving approval and compli-
153. Id. at 1343.
154. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470.
155. 832 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1992).
156. Id. at 575; Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
157. See id. at 576; see also FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
158. Marshall, 832 P.2d at 577; FDA Review Process Overview, supra note 19.
159. See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 889 (Ct. App. 1997).
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ance, although the Marshall court dealt with a preemptive law that
requires courts to determine compliance unlike the MDA, where com-
pliance is determined by the FDA. This analysis of Steele's authority
makes it evident that the court read these two requirements into prior
cases and had no foundation for their creation.
2. The Proof Requirement Is Inappropriate
In addition to the fact that the requirement derives from a case
that did not support its existence, and may have even implicitly de-
nied the requirement and another case with highly distinguishable
facts, every circuit court decision addressing this issue has declined to
uphold the requirement. 160
It follows logically from Congress's intent to allow the FDA to de-
velop preemptive regulatory schemes regarding Class III medical de-
vices that non-compliance with the federal regulations does not
preclude the possibility of preemption, making it understandable that
every circuit court to address the issue found that preemption was, in
fact, not precluded by non-compliance. 16' Class III devices undergo
the most stringent control of any of the devices under the MDA.162
The control includes both pre-market requirements and continuing
post-market approval requirements. 63 The pre-market requirements,
focused on safety and effectiveness of the device, require the applicant
to undergo the PMA process, which forces the manufacturer to spend
an average of 1200 hours on each submission detailing information
regarding the safety and efficacy of the device.16 4 The post-approval
requirements include resubmission to the PMA process when any sub-
sequent change is made to the product and the submission of detailed
approval reports on a yearly basis. 165 These MDA requirements are
extremely taxing on the company; however, they are far less taxing
and likely more effective than requiring the company to comply with
fifty or more similar yet slightly different requirements that would be
160. Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1328-29 (3rd Cir. 1995); Reeves v. AcroMed
Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Kimberly
Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 992 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519
(lth Cir. 1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1140 (1st Cir. 1993) (AldrichJ,
concurring).
161. Michael, 46 F.3d at 1328-29; Reeves, 44 F.3d at 307; Nat'l Bank of Commerce of El
Dorado, 38 F.3d at 992 n.2; Papas, 985 F.2d at 519; King, 983 F.2d at 1140.
162. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2000).
163. Id. § 360e.
164. Id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
165. 21 U.S.C. § 360i; 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2005); see also Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 905-06 (Ct. App. 1995).
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imposed if state law were not preempted. The result of such require-
ments on top of the already extensive federal requirement would hin-
der progress in the field of medical devices and greatly increase the
cost born by the end consumer, two interests that Congress was explic-
itly attempting to protect.1
6 6
Conclusion
The court in Steele properly stated that the PMA process may pre-
empt state law tort claims.167 However, the burden Steele places on the
moving defendant to show preemption is far too great. By imposing
this great burden, the court has effectively removed the ability to
move for summary judgment based on federal preemption. The
proper burden should require a moving defendant to assert that it has
been properly certified through the FDA's PMA process and that the
certification was valid throughout the time in question. This should be
all that is required to meet its prima facie showing for preemption to
apply. The burden should then shift to the non-moving party to point
out specific instances of non-compliance or improper certification.
Absence of this showing by the non-moving party should be equated
with the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the case
should be dismissed due to federal preemption of the law. Just as this
standard would give our recent graduate employment, it would allow
manufacturers to abide by the federal standards emanating from the
MDA as Congress intended without fear of being tried based on any of
fifty different or additional standards of each state.
166. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 853, 94th Cong. 1, 12 (1976).
167. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 888 (Ct. App. 1997).
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